

HANDLE VIA TALENT-
KEYHOLE CHANNELS
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TCS-8483-61-KH
Copy 15 of 26

COMOR-D-31

3 January 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR:

COMOR

SUBJECT:

Security Handling of ARGON Materials

1. For the information and for the record of the members of COMOR, there is attached hereto a memorandum which confirms the arrangements agreed by the participating agencies for the handling of ARGON materials when they are available (see the attachment TCS-6710-60-KH [REDACTED] 19 January 1960). The memorandum, TCS-8176-60-KH [REDACTED] 7 November 1960, also specifies the security arrangements for the handling of the ARGON product at [REDACTED]. These arrangements have been approved by the Director of Central Intelligence. 25X1A

2. It would be appreciated if you would study this paper prior to the COMOR meeting next Thursday, 5 January 1960, and raise any questions which you perceive.

[REDACTED]

25X1A

JAMES Q. REBER
Chairman

Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance

Attachments:

1. TCS-8176-60-KH [REDACTED]
2. TCS-6710-60-KH [REDACTED]

Copy 2--OSD

3--JCS TCO

4--OACSI TCO

5, 6, 7--ONI TCO

8, 9--AFCIN TCO

10--NSA TCO

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TCS-8176-60-KH [REDACTED]

7 November 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
THROUGH: Deputy Director (Plans)
SUBJECT: Security Handling of ARGON Materials
REFERENCE: TCS-6710-60-KH [REDACTED] (attached)

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1. This memorandum requests your approval of paragraph 7.

2. As indicated in the attached paper (dated January 19, 1960), the DDP has approved a security system for the handling of ARGON materials when they are available, which had previously been agreed to by the parties principally interested, namely, the Department of Defense agencies and CIA, including DPD and TSO/CIA.

3. DPD (R&D, Cover, and Security), TSO/CIA, and [REDACTED] of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (Research and Engineering) have reviewed the paper and have concluded that the plans set forth in the attached are still applicable and should be applied upon the receipt of ARGON materials sometime after December 1, 1960.

4. Special attention is called to paragraph 4d on page 2 of the attached. The two industries that are involved in paragraph d are Eastman Kodak and [REDACTED]. The latter will receive the film titled TOP SECRET DAFF (the codeword for identification of ARGON product) and will perform data reduction essential to the use of the materials for geodetic control and mapping. About [REDACTED] personnel will be involved in this performance. Those at [REDACTED] now operating with an ARGON clearance number around [REDACTED]. After successful completion of ARGON operation, most of these will be debriefed. It is

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planned that those required to perform the data reduction function will have an ARGON clearance only. That clearance was designed to protect the fact of satellite reconnaissance of which the material is evidence. We do not want these people to have access either to TALENT or to TALENT-KEYHOLE materials, and by this arrangement they are inhibited. It will be necessary for a few of the officers at [REDACTED] to use some few frames from the various configurations of CHALICE photography and of CORONA photography, both obtained over the United States. Authorization can be granted to remove several frames of these materials and make them available at the SECRET NOFORN level. Instructions derived from an examination of these two types of photography in connection with the ARGON product can then be given to the [REDACTED] personnel concerned, such instructions revealing nothing regarding either manned aircraft or satellite photography.

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5. To implement the foregoing will require:

a. The establishment of the ARGON clearances indicated.

b. The establishment of a secure compartment at [REDACTED]

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c. The presence of a CIA security officer to establish security procedures and monitor performance.

The security officer at [REDACTED] will be responsible to DPD/SO in the same way as is the security officer at Eastman Kodak. Materials moving from and to [REDACTED] will be supervised in exactly the same way as materials now moved from and to Eastman Kodak.

6. Finally, attention is called to the concern of the White House for security bearing on satellite reconnaissance and particularly the great concern with regard to the numbers of people cleared into the T-KH system. Because of that and because of the imminence of an ARGON shot in December 1960, it is believed best to apprise the White House promptly of these developing events and our plans for handling the security in regard thereto.

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TCS-8176-60-KH [REDACTED]

7. **Recommendation:** It is recommended that the security protection of ARGON materials at [REDACTED] should be the responsibility of ARGON operations security (DPD/SO). It is further recommended that DPD/SO be instructed to take the following steps immediately.

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a. To assign a security officer to be stationed at [REDACTED] to monitor and supervise security matters.

b. To prepare security procedures for the handling of the ARGON product, these to be comparable to the clearance evaluation standards and procedures required in TALENT and TALENT-KEYHOLE.

c. To establish a secure area at [REDACTED] for the handling of data reduction of the ARGON product.

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8. It is also recommended that General Goodpaster be briefed at an early date on the current plans for the handling of ARGON products as outlined in the attached paper as amended by this paper.

signed *W.B.*

**JAMES Q. REBER
Chief, Special Requirements Staff
DPD-DD/P**

**Attachment:
TCS-6710-60-KH** [REDACTED]

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TCS-6710-60-KH

19 January 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director (Plans)
THROUGH: Acting Chief, Development Projects Division, DDP *W.B.*
SUBJECT: Security System for ARGON Materials

1. This memorandum contains a recommendation for approval in paragraph 7.

2. At the request of the CIA Project Manager for ARGON, [REDACTED] I understood, with [REDACTED] the CIA TALENT Security Officer, and [REDACTED] a Project Security Officer, to enter into discussions with [REDACTED] office, OSD, and the representatives of the military services, on the problem of security handling of the products of ARGON.

3. We are in agreement on the following:

a. It is understood that the President's security injunction concerning Satellite photographic reconnaissance of the USSR applies to ARGON materials.

b. The TALENT and TALENT-KEYHOLE security arrangements have been working properly and are well understood. There will be better understanding and less chance of security breach if the control of ARGON materials can be associated with TALENT and TALENT-KEYHOLE security practices.

c. Furthermore, it is anticipated that there will be a number of occasions, some predictable, others not predictable, when the full exploitation of ARGON materials may require access to TALENT and TALENT-KEYHOLE materials and vice versa.

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4. On the basis of the foregoing, there was agreement by all concerned that the following should apply to the handling of the end products of ARGON:

a. ARGON products should be managed within the T-KH system. Security standards now applied to the TALENT-KEYHOLE system would apply to the handling of ARGON products.

b. The codeword indicator for ARGON materials will be DAFF, with the security classification of TOP SECRET.

c. Those certified for TALENT-KEYHOLE will have access to CORONA or ARGON products or the product of CHALICE on a "must know" basis only.

d. A few key officers in the industries responsible for processing the end product of ARGON may require a TALENT-KEYHOLE certification. This will be on a basis of specific justification. TALENT-KEYHOLE clearance will not be required generally for the personnel in industry who are engaged in processing ARGON products.

5. The participating agencies are currently engaged in planning the personnel requirements for the exploitation of the ARGON product.

6. For reference, the TALENT-KEYHOLE Manual is attached.

7. RECOMMENDATION

It is recommended that the procedure outlined in paragraph 4 above be approved.

JAMES Q. REBER
Chairman

Ad Hoc Requirements Committee

Att: T-KH

Recommendation in paragraph 7.
APPROVED

Signed Richard M. Bissell, Jr., 21 Jan. 1960
Deputy Director (Plans)

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- 11-- AC/DPD**
- 12-- DDP(T) TCO**
- 13-- OCI TCO**
- 14-- OSI TCO**
- 15-- ORR TCO**
- 16-- Director, PIC**
- 17-- CIA TSO**
- 18-- C/DMD/PIC**
- 19-- C/DMD/PIC**
- 20-- DDP TCO**
- 21-- IO/Ops/DPD**
- 22-- SO/DPD**
- 23-26-- C/SRS/DPD/DDP**

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